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Who's Running the Road? Street 
Railway Strikes and the Problem of 
Constructing a Liberal Capitalist 
Order in Canada, 1886-1914 
Eric Tucker
*
 
 
Street railway strikes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
were frequently the occasion for largescale collective violence in N orth Ameri 
can cities and challenged the capacity of local authorities to maintain civic 
order. However, this was only the most visible manifestation of the challenge 
that street railway workers' collective action posed to the order of liberal 
capitalism, an order constructed on several intersecting dimensions. Using the 
example of Canadian street railway workers from 1886 to 1914 , a period of 
rapid urbanization and industrialization, this article explores the ways the 
collective action by workers and their community sympathi zers challenged 
the workplace , marketplace , and "streetplace" orders of liberal capitalism. It 
discusses how those challenges were met through political and legal processes of 
resistance and accommodation , taking into account the fragmentation of state 
power, hostile public opinion toward the street railways , and conflicting views 
over the legitimate scope for workers' collective action. 
 
Give us this road and we will run it. [Anonymous protester,  1899] 
 
( Palmer  1976, 122) 
The streets of a city are for business, not for demonstrations. 
( Toronto Globe, 1902e) 
 
 
                                                          
* Eric Tucker is a professor of law at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University 
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INTRODUCTION: WORKERS' COLLECTIVE ACTION AND 
WORKPLACE, MARK'ETPLACE, AND STREETPLACE ORDER 
 
Canadian street railway strikes between 1886 and 1914, a period of rapid 
urbanization and industrialization, are most remembered for the large-scale 
communal violence that frequently accompanied them. There were at least 
seventeen strikes by streetcar workers,  and significant collective violence occurred 
in thirteen of them (Table 1).1 On five  occasions-London, Ontario, in 1899, Toronto 
in 1902, Winnipeg in 1906, Hamilton in 1906, and Saint John in 1914-the militia was 
called in to deal with the perceived threat to civic order. Yet the story of conflict is 
reflective of a more general phenomenon; workers' collective action has always fit 
uneasily in liberal capitalist societies, even though it has been present in one form 
or another, requiring a societal response and often being a force for social reform. 
This uneasy fit arises from the fact that workers' collective action potentially 
interferes with the paradigmatic order of liberal capitalism on at least three 
overlapping dimensions.2 Most directly, workers' collective action challenges the 
ideal workplace order of liberal capitalism in which the owners of capital are free to 
decide how to use their wealth, with whom they will contract and on what terms, 
and how production will be organized, subject only to the constraints of a labor 
market in which individual workers compete in selling their capacity to work. The 
street railway workers' demands for union recognition and for a grievance procedure 
clearly challenged the workplace order their employers sought and claimed as a 
right to impose-employer unilateralism- and sought to replace it with a different 
regime, described by David Brody (1993) as "workplace contractualism" (221) 
characterized by collectively bargained contracts that governed labor-management 
relations. Collective action to realize this transformation in the workplace order 
and employer resistance were the underlying causes of most street railway strikes 
during the period under consideration. 
The outcome of struggles over workplace order partly depended on the 
marketplace and streetplace orders, which were also often sites of contesta- tion 
between workers and employers. Workers' collective action threatened to upset the 
ideal marketplace or economic order of liberal capitalism, char- acterized by the 
freedom of individuals to pursue their self-interest in markets with a minimum of 
interference from third parties by counterposing the principle and practice of 
worker solidarity-a view expressed most clearly in the slogan of the Knights of Labor, 
"An injury to one is an injury to all."3 Most obviously,  collective worker  action 
aimed  to disrupt  the capitalist  labor market through the creation of quasi 
monopolies over labor supply, but it also was liable to pose a broader threat by 
interfering with other market exchanges. For example, workers might attempt to 
convince suppliers or customers not to do business with their employer until a 
satisfactory agree- ment was reached. Workers employed by other firms might 
come to the assistance of striking workers by refusing to handle struck work, or they 
might strike against their own employers to enforce their fellow workers' demands. 
Collective action could also indirectly interfere with the operation of the 
marketplace when, for example, an industrial dispute interrupted the produc- tion or 
distribution of goods and services, such as fuel supplies, upon which a large number 
of other businesses or individuals depended. Street railway strikes challenged the 
economic order most directly by disrupting the urban transportation  infrastructure  
that had facilitated  the growth of cities, the creation of concentrated downtown 
business districts, and the dispersion of the population thereby making workers, 
shoppers, and downtown businesses increasingly dependent on their service (Olsen 
1991, 251-52; Warner 1962, 15-29; Fogelson 2001, 9-43). 
  
 
 
TABLE 1. 
Canadian Street Railway Strikes, 1886-1914 
 
 
Place Date & Duration Workplace Issues Streetplace Events State Responses Strike Outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Montreal, PQ Feb. 1903 (2 days) 
 
Montreal, PQ May 1903 (4 days) 
 
 
working conditions; union 
recognition 
Firing of union members;  wage 
increase; union recognition 
Wages and working conditions; 
grievance  procedure;  union 
recognition; closed shop 
 
 
thrown;  cars damaged 
Minor crowd violence 
Minor  crowd  violence 
 
 
settled before they arrived; 
arrests 
Local police; few arrests 
 
Local  policei  few arrests 
 
 
recognhed;  grievance 
procedurei wage increase 
Union victory 
 
Company victory; Feb. 
agreement  restored;  local 
association   replaces 
AASRE 
 
Toronto, ON 
 
Mar. 1886 (3 days} 
 
Firing of union members 
 
Crowds blocked tracks; cars 
damaged; confrontations with 
police; police and citizens 
injured 
 
Police attempted to keep tracks 
clear and protect co. property; 
arrests resulting  in fines and 
imprisonment 
 
Union  members reinstated 
Toronto, ON May-June 1886 Firing of union members Crowds blocked tracks; cars Police and mounted police Strike lost, union disbanded 
   damaged; confrontations with attempted to keep tracks dear  
   police; police and citizens and protect co. property;  
   injured arrests resulting in fines  
Hamilton, ON Sept. 1892 (3 days) Firing of union members None None Compromise:  improved 
     conditions,  discharged 
     men paid off; strikers 
     subsequently laid off 
London, ON Oct. 1898 (15 days} Firing of union members; Cars pelted, operators taunted None Compromise:  reinstatement, 
  working conditions; union   improved conditions, right 
  recognition   to join union but no 
     recognition 
London, ON May-Nov. 1899 Firing of union membersi 
working  conditions;  union 
Escalating crowd violence 
(July 8) 
Riot Act read; militia called up; 
arrests resulting in fines and 
Strike lost 
  recognition  imprisonment  
Toronto, ON June 1902 (3 days) Firing of union members; Large crowds blocked cars; stones Militia called up but strike Union win: right to organize 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. 
( Continued ) 
 
 
Place Date & Duration 
 
Workplace Issues Streetplace Events State Responses Strike Outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: MB (Manitoba), NB (New Brunswick), NS (Nova Scotia), ON (Ontario), PQ (Province of Quebec). 
Cornwall, ON 
Winnipeg, 
 
June 1905 (7 days) 
Mar. 1906 (9days) 
 
Wage increase 
Union recognition, wages 
 
None 
Crowd violence; strikebreakers 
 
None 
Riot Act read; militia called up; 
No change in wages 
Compromise 
MB   assaulted pickets arrests resulting in fines and 
imprisonment 
 
London, ON July 1906 (21 days) Discharge  of union members; None Local police; strike sympathizer Union loss 
  working conditions  arrested and fined for calling  
    motorman a scab  
Levis, PQ Sept. 1906 (2 days) Discharge of union activists None None Union loss 
Hamilton, ON Nov. 1906 (26 
days) 
Discharge  of union president; 
failure to comply with prior 
Escalating crowd violence Riot Act read; militia called up 
and deployed; arrests resulting 
Arbitration of disagreement 
by ORMB produces 
  arbitration  award  in fines and imprisonment compromise 
Winnipeg, 
MB 
Dec. 1910 (15 
days) 
Discharge of union officers Escalating crowd violence Local police; arrests resulting in 
fines and imprisonment 
Terms not disclosed; strikers 
rehired 
Port Arthur, 
Fort 
May-June 1913 
(I month) 
Discharge of employees, wage 
increase 
Crowd  violence; one sympathizer 
shot and killed by police, 
Local police; arrests Union loss 
William, ON   another wounded   
Halifax, NS May 1913 (4 days) Wage increase Crowd violence; car wrecking Local police; arrests Compromise 
Saint John, July 1914 (5 days) Discharge of union officer and Crowd violence; sympathizer Riot Act read, soldiers charged 9 of 11 discharged workers 
NB  men shot in leg by police officer crowd; troops requested; reinstated 
    arrests  
 
  
The broader the scope for workers' solidarity in the marketplace, the better their 
chances to transform the workplace order. Finally, workers' collective action could 
interfere with the paradigmatic streetplace or civic order of liberal capitalism, which 
was characterized by the right of individuals to move freely on public streets and spaces 
without being threatened or impeded by other individuals, and by the protection of 
their property from invasions or obstructions.4 However, the idea expressed in the 
Toronto Globe editorial excerpted at the beginning of this article-that streets were 
places  for business,  not demonstrations-was opposed  by older but evolving 
popular traditions of parading and protesting, sometimes peacefully and sometimes 
not.5 The legitimate use of public space was highly contested in nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century  North America, and collective violence was not uncommon 
(Goheen 1994, 430; Ryan 1997; Heron and Penfold 2005, 4-27; Lord 2005, 17; 
Fyson 2009). While disciplined parades of striking street railway workers on city 
streets stayed well within the legal boundaries of the streetplace order, raucous 
gatherings of strike sympathizers that prevented streetcars from running over rights-of-
way granted by munici- pal authorities clearly did not; nor did those who committed 
violent attacks on street railway property or on replacement workers who operated 
the cars during a strike. Traffic across the normative and legal boundaries of the 
streetplace order, however, was two way. Street railway operators were also prepared 
to violate legal and normative standards by hiring private security guards who carried 
arms and threatened or used violence to keep the street cars running. 
There is an implicit tension in the above formulation between an essentialist view 
of workplace, marketplace, and streetplace orders under liberal capitalism, and the claim 
made earlier  that  those orders were  made and remade partly in response to workers' 
collective action. This can be resolved, however, by distinguishing between two levels of 
analytical abstraction: at the highest level of abstraction, it is both possible and useful 
to identify quintessential features  of  a  liberal  order,  while  simultaneously, and at a 
lower level of abstraction, recognizing that actually existing liberal orders are the 
product of historical processes of social conflict and accom- modation between classes 
and other forces.6 While this article draws on an essentialist baseline, I am not making 
a functionalist claim that an idealized version of order is or was necessary  or 
functionally optimal for liberal capi- talism. Rather, the claim  is that a particular  
vision of order  lay at the core of the project of imposing liberal capitalist rule but that 
such an ideal was always contested. The article's focus is on the making of  actual  
liberal orders, and, more particularly, on the challenges collective action by street- car 
workers  and their  supporters in Canada created for, and the impact and it had on, the 
three dimensions of liberal capitalist ordering they  con- fronted. While this study is 
local, the processes of constructing the liberal orders that it examines should be  of  
general  interest  to  North  American legal and  labor historians. 
The role of law and the state was central to the construction and maintenance of 
order in liberal capitalism, but this does not mean that law and the state exercised a 
monopoly. Legal pluralists make the important point that social order is the 
product of  multiple processes and that it should not be assumed that state law is 
always the most significant or influ- ential (Merry 1988, 869). This perspective has 
been particularly influential in the labor field, where it has been applied both 
descriptively to explain how industrial relations-workplace orders-are  negotiated  
and  renegoti- ated on a daily basis, and normatively in defense of an approach to 
labor policy that leaves the workplace parties ample room to devise and imple- 
ment their own arrangements through collective bargaining rather than by having 
the state directly impose terms and conditions of  employment. While this 
perspective  usefully draws our attention to the importance of nonstate ordering 
processes, under liberal capitalism it often fails  to adequately address the centrality of 
law and  the  state  in  establishing  the rules of the game, including the extent to which 
nonstate processes will be allowed to establish workplace, marketplace, or streetplace 
order. Addition- ally, the role of unequal power relations endemic in capitalist societies is 
undertheorized in pluralists' explorations  of  nonstate  ordering  systems,  as are its 
implications for the process of determining whose vision of order becomes privileged in 
state law (Kidder  1997). The  approach  adopted  in this article  places state law at the 
center but  understands  that  the role  of that law and its significance relative to other 
ordering processes will vary from sphere to sphere depending on a variety of factors. 
The article's approach also locates state and nonstate ordering  processes  within  the 
context of a social formation, liberal capitalism-which is characterized structurally by 
unequal power  relations-and  it explores  the  often  conflict- ing visions and practices 
of order that shaped and reshaped liberal order. Finally, the article takes care to 
emphasize that in the context of street railways, decisions about enforcing order were 
typically made at the lower levels of the legal and political system. There were, for 
example, no high court judgments to emerge from any of the prosecutions heard mostly 
in magistrates'  courts, while decisions about when  to use force were made by local 
officials. 7 
The distinction between high and low law leads to another dimension of pluralism: 
the importance of recognizing that the state ordering process itself is highly fragmented 
along several dimensions.  First, in Canada there is the constitutional division of power 
between federal and provincial governments and a further statutory delegation of power 
to local authorities, all of whom share responsibility, to different degrees and in 
different ways, for enacting and enforcing law. State power is further fragmented at any 
particular level of government between its different branches as well as within 
branches. These divisions will become especially apparent in the context of the street 
railway strikes, which involved the federal and municipal governments; local and 
provincial police and the militia; police magistrates; federal criminal law; and federal, 
provincial, and municipal regulatory law, among others. Although it does not 
necessarily follow that a highly fragmented state cannot respond forcefully and with 
unity of purpose to maintain a  given  sociolegal  order when it is perceived to be under 
attack, the possibility does exist that dis- agreements over what order requires and 
how to achieve it may emerge and be exploited to create more space than is normally 
available to actors who generally experience state law as a set of constraints rather 
than as a source of empowerment. 
 I. WORKING ON THE STREET RAILWAY: THE STRUGGLE TO 
CHANGE THE WORKPLACE ORDER 
 
Street railways in the era prior to World War I were, with few exceptions, privately 
owned and operated.8 Unlike other private businesses, however, street railways 
enjoyed monopoly rights granted by municipalities to provide transportation services 
according to terms and conditions specified in the franchise. As private, for-profit, 
public service providers, they were under much greater public scrutiny and control 
than most other private businesses. The creation of a street railway system involved a 
large investment of capital, but it also came with an obligation to provide service at a 
specified fare. The switch from horse-drawn carriages to electrified streetcars in the 
1890s further increased the capital cost of the system, as did its extension to suburban 
areas. 
Labor costs were by far the largest variable cost, and thus street railway owners soon 
learned that the profitability of their operations depended  to  a great extent on their 
ability to keep labor costs under control ( Davis 1979; Cheape 1980; Armstrong and 
Nelles 1986, 40-41). For the most part, street railways sought to achieve this objective 
by keeping wages low and hours long, impos- ing strict discipline on employees, and, if 
employees tried to organize a union to improve their conditions, fiercely fighting to 
keep their workplaces union free.9 One technique commonly deployed by street railways 
was to  hire private detective agencies that spied on their workforces to uncover 
employee misbehavior and union activity. 10 This attempt to create and maintain a 
private, unilateral, and authoritarian workplace order, however, often was contested by 
the largest group of street railway employees: conductors and motormen. 11 
While craft workers historically had been able to exert a fairly significant degree of 
job control through their partial monopoly of key skills, most street railway workers, 
including the conductors and drivers with whom this study is chiefly concerned, found 
themselves in a different position  because  the skills involved in their work were either 
widely held, particularly in the days of horse-drawn cars, or could be quickly learned. 
For many, therefore, the primary response to the unsatisfactory work conditions they 
encountered was to quit, so labor turnover was frequent among  motormen  and  
conductors. While this undoubtedly caused some difficulty for employers, it was usually 
not enough to spur them  to  improve  conditions,  although  eventually  some did 
embrace company-sponsored employee associations as means for retaining workers and 
avoiding unionization. 12 A sizable number of conductors and motormen, however, also 
engaged in collective action to contest and reshape the workplace order, 
notwithstanding the formidable obstacles they faced as semiskilled workers. Informal 
associations were established sporadically in the 1870s, and in the 1880s the Knights of 
Labor briefly succeeded in organizing street railway workers in Toronto. A more 
permanent union  presence, however, only emerged after the founding in 1892 of the 
Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees (AASRE) by the American Fed- 
eration of Labor, which began to organize locals in Canada at the end of the 
nineteenth century (Schmidt 1937, 121-52; Armstrong and Nelles 1986, 225-
29).13 In many ways, the AASRE was in the vanguard of the so-called new unionism 
that sought to organize skilled and semiskilled workers on an industrial basis with the 
goal of reshaping the workplace order to more closely conform to conditions previously 
available only to the most skilled (Palmer 1979, 199-216). This fact did not go 
unnoted at the time. For example, following the first Montreal street railway strike, 
which produced a partial victory for the union, the M ontreal Gazette noted, 
The success of the men in the street railway strike . . . will go far towards establishing 
a new standard of wages generally in lines of work where only ordinary skill is 
required . . . . The new rates will enable them to earn yearly wages that heretofore 
have been only within the power of skilled craftsmen. ( M ontreal Gazette 1903a, 6) 
Even more contentious than wage and hour disputes were demands for union 
recognition, the establishment of a grievance system to review man- agement 
discipline, and changes in work rules. Street railway owners found these latter 
demands most unpalatable since they correctly viewed them as fundamentally 
inconsistent with employer unilateralism, the workplace order they wished to 
maintain. The M ontreal Gazette, which staunchly defended the Montreal Street 
Railway during a tumultuous strike in May 1903, articu- lated the employer's position 
in one of its strike-related editorials: 
There are two sets of issues. . . . One affects hours and pay. . . . The other touches the 
control of the company over its property and those who it pays to operate it; and 
this is the serious side of the difficulty. . . . The men left their positions for the 
purpose of compelling the company to . . . recognize their union as its master. . . . 
That is why the present fight must be a fight to the finish-the finish of the union with 
its foreign affiliations which dares to demand the abolition of free labor and the 
control of the men who operate the leading public convenience of Montreal. ( M 
ontreal Gazette 1903b, 6) 
Workers, too, understood that their demands challenged what they increas- ingly 
viewed as an intolerably autocratic workplace order in which employers enjoyed nearly 
unlimited management prerogatives based on the combina- tion of employee market 
dependence and employer property ownership. For street railway workers, 
unionization promised not only higher wages, but also a measure of personal dignity 
and a collective voice that would give them some control over the labor process. In 
short, they were seeking to establish a new workplace order-workplace 
contractualism-undergirded  by  the notion that terms and conditions should be 
settled by negotiation and that managerial authority should be reviewable (Brody 
1993). 
The legal regime under which workplace order was established  and contested 
in the 1880s has been labeled "liberal voluntarism" (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 2). 
At its core were freedom of contract and the rights of property. Employers as 
owners of the means of production had the right to determine how their property 
would be used, and they enjoyed the freedom to choose with whom to contract and 
on what terms. Workers also enjoyed freedom of contract, which included the 
privilege of joining with other workers for the purposes of improving  the terms 
and conditions of their employment; but employers were free to refuse to hire or to 
fire workers who chose to join unions. Similarly, workers could collectively 
withdraw their labor (that is, to strike) in order to pressure their employer to agree 
to the terms and conditions they demanded; but employers, again, were free to hire 
other workers to take their place. Moreover, striking workers were restricted in the 
actions they could take to make their strikes effective by the employers' rights of 
freedom of contract (which, for example, required striking workers not to interfere 
with the hiring of replacement workers by their employers), as well as by their 
private property rights (which, for example, prevented striking workers from 
blocking access to their employers' premises). These restraints were embodied in 
both civil and criminal law. Finally, even when settlements were reached with trade 
unions they were not legally enforceable. Not only did trade unions lack legal 
personality (a situation that, much to the regret of employers, also made it difficult for 
employers to sue them), but also courts held that there was no intention to create legal 
relations. As a result, negotiated changes to the workplace order were  potentially  
unstable  since both employers and unions were legally free to ignore agreements when 
they thought it was to their advantage to do so. This often produced a second round  
of industrial conflict.14 
The legal framework within which the workplace order was contested had 
changed in two respects by 1914, leading to a regime change labeled "industrial 
voluntarism" (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 16). The most significant modification was 
the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA), enacted in 1907, which prohibited 
strikes and lockouts in industries that were con- sidered public utilities until after 
the completion of a conciliation process. Although the principal justification for this 
legislation was to ameliorate the adverse effect of industrial conflict on the economic 
order, it affected to some degree the conduct of disputes over the workplace order. 
The other change was the introduction of limited minimum standards that made the 
determi- nation of certain aspects of the workplace order a public matter for political 
and regulatory authorities rather than a private issue to be resolved by con- tract 
between workers and street railway companies. This occurred most commonly 
when the workplace order had implications for the health and safety of workers 
and members of the public (Tucker 1990). In the case of street railways, tum-of-the-
century efforts to impose apprenticeship require- ments failed, but in 1912 an 
Ontario regulatory board was empowered to establish maximum hours of work for 
motormen and conductors; in no case were employees to be permitted to work more 
than six days a week or ten hours a day.15 Earlier, in at least one Ontario 
municipality (Hamilton), the franchise agreement between the city and the street 
railway established maximum hours and minimum wages. 16 In Nova Scotia, 
legislation was enacted in 1911 requiring that motormen and conductors be 
protected against the weather. The realm of regulated work conditions was subsequently 
expanded in 1912 to include braking systems, seating, training, and working hours-all 
matters that touched on both worker and public safety.17 
Overall, by the end of 1914, street railway workers and their unions had managed to 
make modest changes to the workplace order through a combi- nation of collective 
bargaining, arbitration, and conciliation (see Part II of this article for marketplace 
order), strike activity (see Part III for streetplace order), and legislated minimum 
standards, although the picture varied markedly from city to city. Toronto workers 
were more successful than most. Although the first organizing effort by the Knights 
was resoundingly defeated in the second 1886 strike (Morton 1975, 44-56; Kealey 
1980, 199-212; Tucker 1994, 295-308), the 1902 AASRE organizing campaign and 
strike won the right of employees to join a union without facing retaliation, access to a 
grievance procedure, and a wage increase ( Labour Gazette 1902). A new agreement, 
reached the following year, provided for conciliation and binding arbitration of 
grievances, as well as provisions relating to working conditions such as stools and 
closed vestibules for motormen ( Labour Gazette 1903b). Although management 
refused to formally recognize the union, always insist- ing that it was dealing with 
employee representatives and not the union, a reasonably stable collective bargaining 
relationship developed. 
18 
Indeed, two subsequent arbitration awards began to elaborate 
the framework that came to typify industrial legality in the post-World War II era 
(Palmer 1992, 278-84). In the first, involving a dispute over the dismissal of 
employees found inter- fering with three other employees who had scabbed in 
Winnipeg during an earlier street railway strike, the arbitration panel affirmed the 
employer's "inherent right" to manage its employees subject only to the terms of 
the agreement and applicable laws. In the second, the arbitrator recognized the right 
of employees to refuse work that endangered their or the public's health or safety 
without being disciplined beyond the loss of wages for the time they did not work ( 
Labour Gazette 1906e, 1908a). Subsequent agreements, reached with the assistance of 
IDIA conciliation, introduced progressive discipline and additional work rules ( 
Labour Gazette 1910, 1912b). 
Street railway workers in Hamilton ( Labour Gazette 1908b, 1909, 1913c),19   Ottawa   
( Labour   Gazette   1908c,  1912a,  1914b),  Quebec  City  ( Labour Gazette 1908d, 
1913a), Saint John ( Labour Gazette 1914a; Babcock 1982), and Vancouver (Roy 
1972-73, 3-10; Labour Gazette 1913d) also seemed to have established relatively 
stable collective bargaining relations prior to World War I.Less successful were street 
railway workers in Winnipeg, despite two violent strikes. The first, in 1906, resulted in 
a wage increase but no form of union recognition. The second, in 1910, was called in 
response to the termination of union officers allegedly enticed by private detectives 
to violate company rules by entering a tavern while in uniform. The officers failed 
to obtain their reinstatement; the strike was instead settled on the basis that the striking 
men would be rehired as they were needed ( Labour Gazette 1906a, 1906b, 191la, 
191lb; M otorman & Conductor 1911). Finally, street railway workers in Cornwall ( 
Labour Gazette 1905), Halifax (Lambly 1983, chap. 3), Levis ( Labour Gazette 
1906f), London, Ontario ( Labour Gazette 1906c, 1906d), Montreal ( Labour Gazette 
1903c, 1903e), and Port Arthur and Fort William ( Labour Gazette 1913e, 1913f; 
Morrison 1974, chap. 9) lost strikes, and their unions either disbanded or barely 
hung on. To more fully understand these outcomes, however, it is necessary to turn 
our attention to the two other dimensions of liberal capitalist ordering that collective 
action confronted: the economic order and the civic order. 
 
 
II. PROTECTING  THE MARKETPLACE  ORDER AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKPLACE REORDERING 
 
The central ideological premise of early twentieth-century Canadian industrial 
relations policy was that the public had an interest in limiting harm to the economic 
order caused by workplace conflict. This goal was indirectly advanced by removing 
some causes of workplace conflict through the direct regulation of workplace 
conditions affecting health and safety, but the prin- cipal Canadian innovation was 
legislation that compelled conciliation prior to a strike or lockout (Fudge and 
Tucker 2001, 16-50).20 This legislation, however, only applied to those sectors of 
the economy that were deemed public utilities, such as transportation, because they 
provided infrastructural support for the broader economy. Street railway strikes 
arguably fell within this category, although their actual impact on the local economy 
was more a matter of speculation than rigorous investigation.21 At the very least, 
street railway strikes caused much inconvenience because of the growing depen- 
dence of a more dispersed urban population on their service. Additionally, even 
though most street railways were privately owned, the fact that they obtained 
monopoly franchises from the city strengthened the popular view that they were 
public utilities that should be made subject to greater public and governmental 
regulation than would otherwise be justified. As the Free Press noted in an editorial 
after the settlement of the 1906 Winnipeg strike, "The civic car service is a public 
franchise and the public should have the right to have representatives of the public 
interest intervene, if necessary" (Winnipeg Free Press 1906h). 
Legal intervention in labor disputes to protect the economic order, however, was 
problematic from the perspective of liberal voluntarism, which viewed the marketplace 
as a realm of freedom of contract. The dilemma, then, was how to protect the 
marketplace order of liberal capitalism from the disruptive effects of labor conflict 
without subverting it. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the common 
law was just beginning to develop economic tort doctrines that could be used to limit 
secondary actions directly aimed at third parties, but it had virtually nothing to offer 
when industrial conflict indirectly caused harm (Tucker and Fudge 1996). Strikes 
could be prohibited by legislation, but that was not seriously considered at the time. 
Rather, attention was focused on mediation and conciliation  through the 
involvement of neutral third parties-practices that were common but that occurred 
almost entirely on an ad hoc and voluntary basis. For example, the Toronto civic 
railway strike of March 1886 and the Montreal strike of February 1903 were settled with 
the assistance of groups of aldermen, while the Toronto Board of Trade helped resolve 
the Toronto strike of J une 1902, and the Winnipeg Ministerial Association mediated 
the March 1906strike in that city. There was also some provincial trade dispute 
legislation enacted during this period, but with one exception it operated on an entirely 
voluntary basis: both parties had to agree to participate in the dispute resolution 
process, though findings or recommendations were not binding (British Columbia 
Legislative 
Assembly  1895; Martin 1954; Mitchell  1990; McCallum  1991).22 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the federal government was becoming 
increasingly concerned  about the impact of industrial conflict on the national 
economy and its development strategy, particularly when it affected the coal and 
transportation industries. In 1900 the federal government enacted conciliation 
legislation that operated on a completely voluntary basis (Conciliation Act 1900), but 
when this law failed to prevent strikes on the railways, the government considered 
introducing stronger measures. In 1902 it presented a bill making binding arbitration 
of disputes on steam and civic railways compulsory. The bill was abandoned due to 
lack of support, but the following year the government introduced a more modest 
alternative in the Railway Labour Disputes Act ( 1903) (RLDA). Itallowed either of the 
parties, an affected municipality, or the federal government to initiate a conciliation 
process before a tripartite board and, if that failed to resolve the dispute, the matter 
could be sent to an arbitration board, which was fortified with quasi- judicial powers 
of investigation and was required to publish a nonbinding report proposing terms 
of settlement. Although the RLDA created a legal power to investigate, it did not 
deviate far from the norms of liberal volun- tarism: the act neither limited the 
freedom of the parties to engage in indus- trial action nor required  them to accept  
the board's  proposed  resolution 
( Labour Gazette 1903d; Craven 1980, 273-79; Russell 1990, chap. 2; Webber 
1991; Fudge and Tucker 2001, 34-43). 
The reluctance to use more legal compulsion to protect the marketplace economic 
order from the disruptive effects of industrial conflict not only sprung from 
inconsistency with the vision of liberal voluntarism, but also was the product of 
conflicting views between labor and capital and among their factions. The Knights of 
Labor favored arbitration of disputes not because of a concern about the adverse 
effect of industrial conflict on the economic order, but for both ideological and 
strategic reasons. Ideologically, the Knights envisioned an economic order based on 
mutuality and fairness, rather than the pursuit of self-interest, and arbitration was 
seen as a means of rationally establishing the facts upon which a just workplace order 
should be based. In addition, the Knights recognized that the less-skilled workers they 
organized faced greater difficulties winning strikes against hostile employers who 
could more easily hire replacements. Arbitration, they believed, would yield more 
favorable outcomes (Kealey and Palmer 1982, 330-39) than adversarial dispute. In its 
early years, the national labor federation, the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada 
(TLC), also supported compulsory arbitration but reversed its position in 1902 after 
it became  dominated by international unions affiliated with the American Federation 
of Labor (AFL), a body firmly opposed to such measures. 
Although the AASRE was an AFL affiliate, it departed sharply from the AFL's 
position. It not only supported compulsory arbitration of labor disputes, but its 
constitution required local unions to demand it in contract bargaining as a condition of 
receiving international support for a strike. Like the Knights, who had a strong 
presence among street railway workers during the nine- teenth century, the AASRE 
understood  the strategic value of arbitration. 
Unlike many of the  established craft unions and the railway brotherhoods, which 
organized workers who exercised partial monopolies of skill, the members of the 
AASRE were more easily replaceable and so found it difficult to attain some level of 
union recognition. The agreement of an employer to accept arbitration was viewed as 
a step toward recognition. Moreover, the refusal of an  employer to arbitrate outstanding 
differences played into the union's hands by strengthening its standing in  the  eyes of  
the  community: the union's willingness to accept the verdict of neutral observers made 
its position seem reasonable, in contrast to that  of recalcitrant  employers who put their 
interests ahead  of  the  community's  (Harring  1986). For example, the Toronto Globe 
published an editorial prior to the June 1902 strike noting, "The company operating a 
profitable public service, which in these  days refuses to arbitrate, necessarily and 
properly antagonizes reasonable public opinion" (Toronto Globe 1902a). In subsequent 
editorials  published  during and in the aftermath of the strike, the Globe reiterated its 
support for arbi- tration and complimented the union for its willingness  to submit its 
demands to a process in which "the parties are to come together, lay aside all consid- 
erations of superior force or cleverness, and simply say about each proposition as it 
comes up: 'Is it fair? ls it reasonable?"' ( Toronto Globe 1902b).23 Similarly, the Winnipeg 
Free Press published an editorial following the settlement of the 1906 strike, 
regretting the absence of a formal arbitration clause in the agreement, while the 
Reverend Charles Stewart blamed the strike and the resulting troubles on the company 
because it  had  refused  arbitration (Winnipeg Free Press 1906f, 1906g). 
Community and AASRE support for compulsory arbitration of civic railway 
disputes, however, was not strong enough to overcome TLC, employer, and 
government resistance to such measures. This was reflected in the Ontario Railway 
and Municipal Board Act (1906) (ORMBA), which contained two provisions 
directly related to labor disputes on railways and street railways. Section 58 of the 
act allowed the board to arbitrate street railway disputes that were submitted to it by 
the parties, provided the parties also agreed to abide by its decision, and so it was a 
purely voluntary measure; while section 59 permitted the board to conduct quasi-
judicial hearings into a strike or lockout that harmed the public and to publish its 
findings with recommendations for settlement. The following year, the federal 
government enacted the above-mentioned Industrial Disputes Investigation Act 
(1907) (IDIA), which applied to the coal industry and other public utilities, includ- 
ing street railways. Although street railway strikes were not the government's primary 
concern,  Minister of Labour Rodolphe Lemieux cited the bitter experience of the 
1906 Hamilton strike when speaking in favor of the bill (Canadian House of 
Common 1906-1907, 3010). The IDIA went a step further than previous legislation 
by requiring conciliation before the parties could legally engage in strikes or lockouts, 
but continued to refuse to compel the parties to accept binding arbitration to establish 
the terms of the disputed workplace order. As Jeremy Webber (1991) noted in his 
study of the origins of the IDIA, "Its purpose was to tame the exercise of economic 
power, not displace it. Its goal was to reproduce the kinds of results that an 
unconstrained ordering would have generated, but without the disruption of strikes" 
(46). In short, the government resolved the dilemma of protecting the liberal capi- 
talist economic order without undermining it through mandatory concilia- tion, 
hoping that the IDIA would eliminate unnecessary conflict by fostering rational, self-
interested bargaining constrained by the weight of public opinion. 
It is difficult to assess the  extent to which the IDIA protected the economic order 
by reducing the incidence and duration of street railway strikes. Data collected by 
Benjamin Squires (1918) indicates that from the time the IDIA came into force until 
the end of 1914 it was invoked eighteen times in street railway disputes, and strikes 
occurred in only two of those instances. His data also show that there were three 
street railway disputes for which boards were not constituted and in which there were 
strikes (Squires 1918, see Tables 3 and 5). It seems fair to conclude that the IDIA 
was frequently invoked in disputes between street railways and the AASRE and that 
it facilitated settlements in some cases. Moreover, in the pre-World War I period, the 
act was strongly supported by AASRE officials, who viewed it as providing an 
opportunity for a weak union such as theirs to gain a foothold (Lambly 1983, 62-94; 
Fudge and Tucker 2001, 77-79). 
It is somewhat easier to assess the impact of the IDIA and other forms of conciliation 
on the workplace order. In general, according to Webber (1988a), IDIA boards took 
the view that "employers remained masters of their enterprise, obligated to provide 
a decent living to their employees, but not to share the prerogatives of property" (232). 
This translated into a general refusal by boards to recommend union recognition, a step 
that interfered with management's right not to negotiate with outsiders. Instead, 
boards often recommended that an employer agree to meet with a delegation of its 
own employees and generally endorsed the right of employees to join a union 
without suffering discrimination. When, however, complaints were made that 
employees were discharged for union activity, boards were reluctant to con- tradict 
management's claim that it was disciplining workers for work rule infractions 
(Webber 1988b). In short, it generally endorsed only modest reforms to the 
predominant regime of employer unilateralism and market subordination. 
This pattern was clearly evident in the street railway disputes that were considered 
under both the ORMBA and the IDIA. For example, in the first application of the 
ORMBA, arising out of a strike by street railway employees in London, Ontario, over 
the discharge of three union members, a majority of the board could not find evidence 
that the men were discharged "simply" because of their union activity ( Labour Gazette 
1906d, 318). Similarly, over the dissent of the union nominee, the first IDIA board 
involving  street railway workers also upheld the dismissal of the union president in 
Hamilton for work rule violations one year after a bitter strike ( Labour Gazette 1908b).24 
Later boards often sought a compromise, on the one hand "supporting the authority of 
the manager to preserve discipline," while on the other recom- mending reinstatement 
without back pay based on the employee's long record of loyal service.25 
Similarly, on the issue of union recognition, boards were reluctant to directly 
challenge management rights and instead sought a compromise with which both sides 
could live. For example, in the London, Ontario, concilia- tion referred to above, the 
board rejected  the men's demand for union recognition but supported their right to join 
a union without discrimination: "There is no law compelling the company to treat 
with the union. That is a matter that will have to go on as it has done heretofore. Let 
them treat with the union  as they see fit, just  as the men can form a union  if they 
see fit" ( Labour Gazette 1906d). There were, however, some exceptional cases when 
union recognition was advised, but even when a contract with the union was signed, 
employers often continued to resist. For example, to resolve a heated and violent strike 
in Hamilton in 1906, the parties agreed to submit their dispute to binding arbitration by 
the ORMBA, which awarded the  union formal recognition. A year later (as mentioned 
above) the employer fired the union president  who had led the strike, allegedly 
discriminated against other union members, and supported the formation of a rival 
union. The dispute was referred to an IDIA board for conciliation, where the majority 
rejected the union's complaints. Their comments about the conduct  of  the  interna- tional 
officer who had presented the local union's case reflected the prevalent attitude of 
conciliation boards toward management rights and union recognition: 
The attitude of this gentleman toward the officers of the employing companies was 
such that even had the latter been inclined to make a compromise, they could not well 
have done so with proper self respect and due regard to the discipline of their 
employees, and it is submitted that better results would be obtained by employees in 
industrial disputes, and there would be fewer of such disputes if the foreign element 
were eliminated from them. ( Labour Gazette 1908b) 
 
The union, weakened by internal divisions and operating in a  generally hostile 
climate toward unions, was not in a position to pursue its grievances through strike 
action ( Labour Gazette 1907a, 1908b).26 
Finally, compulsory conciliation made a modest contribution toward changing other 
dimensions of the workplace order. Although boards were, in principle, committed to 
the idea that male workers should be paid a living wage that would enable them to 
support a family, an IDIA board report, issued in relation to a dispute between 
Vancouver  street railway workers  and their employers, declined to recommend a wage 
increase despite finding that the existing wage scale fell considerably short of this 
ideal. It concluded that "wages under the present constitution of society are governed in 
the last analysis by the law  of supply and demand" (quoted in Lambly 1983, 75). Thus, 
while IDIA boards from time to time recommended wage increases and endorsed some 
modest changes in work rules, to a great extent they accepted that the workplace order 
was to be determined according to market forces, as the norms of liberal voluntarism 
dictated. As a result, street railway unions also sought to make some aspects of 
workplace ordering a public issue, par- ticularly as it related to matters of the health 
and safety of both workers and the public. As noted earlier, legislation was enacted in 
Ontario  and  Nova Scotia establishing minimum standards related to hours of work, 
training, seating, and braking systems. 
 
 
III. STREET RAILWAY STRIKES AND THE CHALLENGE TO 
STREETPLACE ORDER 
 
Street railway strikes commonly started with an orderly parade of the motormen 
and conductors through city streets, where they received wide- spread community 
support.27 The slogan "We Will Walk" appeared on badges worn by the public and in 
newspaper advertisements placed by local mer- chants, while local politicians and 
civic leaders expressed their support for the workers' right to organize and earn a fair 
day's pay. None of these actions, however, altered the street railway company's plan 
to defeat the union by operating with hardened strikebreakers and private guards 
obtained from detective agencies. Crowds of strike sympathizers gathered around 
the car barns and on the streets to express their displeasure at the railways' efforts to 
continue operating with scab labor. Often these expressions became quite boisterous and 
pushed the boundaries of legality. In addition to insults, rocks and other missiles might 
be hurled  at the cars and their scab drivers as they drove along their routes. Cars might 
be physically impeded or lines sabotaged. Eventually, more widespread collective 
violence might occur, which was characterized by low levels of coordination and 
moderately low salience of violent interactions. 28 The challenge to the streetplace  or  
civic  order  was often substantial and posed significant problems for public  authorities 
who had to decide where the boundaries of toleration should be drawn and what 
measures should be taken when those boundaries were crossed. As discussed below, the 
answers to these questions varied considerably,  although  in all cases where the salience 
of collective violence increased beyond scattered attacks, coercive state power was 
mobilized  to bring it to an end. 
To better understand what shaped these "repertoires  of  contention" (Tilly 1993, 
264),29 it will be helpful to examine the strategy and tactics of unions and employers, 
the law under which they operated, the identities of the participants, and the 
motivations for challenging civic order. Broadly speaking, the strategy of the street 
railway unions was to force employers to agree to its demands by disrupting business 
as usual. Its principal tactics were the withdrawal of labor and the encouragement of 
riders to boycott the railway. The strategy of street railway companies was to maintain 
service by hiring replacement workers and running the cars regardless. American detec- 
tive agencies got into the business of providing professional strikebreakers, and their 
services were widely used in Canada (Levinson 1935; Norwood 2002, 45-63; Smith 
2003, 39-54). This was perfectly legal as long as the strikebreakers were not imported 
under contract in violation of the  Alien Labour  Act  (1897).30 
The tactical dilemma for striking workers was how to make their strike effective 
when the law governing streetplace order severely limited  their ability to disrupt their 
employer's operations. It was clearly illegal for striking workers or their sympathizers to 
physically interfere with their employer's property or to impede the streetcars, to assault 
or intimidate strikebreakers, or to  interfere  with  members  of  the  public  who  wished  
to  use  the  service. 
Striking workers could lawfully withdraw their own labor and attempt to 
persuade other workers not to take their places. Moreover, apart from legali- ties, it 
was also important for street railway workers to maintain as much public support 
for their cause as they possibly could. This required them to behave respectably, 
which for the most part they did, limiting themselves to orderly parades that were 
clearly legal and to consumer boycotts whose legality was uncertain but that were 
widely viewed as legitimate despite condemnations by editorial writers in the 
business press.31 
The same could not be said for the crowds of sympathizers that gathered both outside 
the car barns and on the streets and engaged in raucous and at times illegal and 
violent behavior. Sometimes strikebreakers instigated vio- lence too, drawing their guns 
and attacking striking workers or individuals in the crowd. Much of this behavior was 
clearly criminal, but often the bound- aries of legal toleration were stretched, and the 
law was not strictly enforced. The picture changed, however, when  collective  violence  
escalated  and became more salient, to include the destruction of streetcars, attacks on 
railway offices, and assaults on scabs. Police who intervened were often mobbed and 
persons under arrest freed. At that point, the enforcement effort would be stepped up. 
The mayor might read the Riot Act,  requiring  all persons to leave the area immediately, 
and the Canadian  militia  might  be called up in aid of the civilian power. 32 
What accounts for the unusual frequency and level of collective vio- lence in 
street railway strikes? A variety of views have been offered to explain crowd violence, 
some of which focus more on the breakdown of normal constraints, while others 
emphasize the sources of discontent and the cultural and ideological  factors that 
legitimized the use of violence in particular contexts (Torrance 1986). More 
recently, Tilly (2003, 5-12) has emphasized a relational analysis that focuses on the 
social interactions that lead to and shape collective violence.  Our focus here is 
primarily on the interaction between social relations, the sources of discontent, and 
popular beliefs. 
It is helpful to begin by asking who was in these crowds. It is important to reiterate 
that the striking workers were not the main participants; indeed, union officials 
distanced the union from the crowd and denounced the vio- lence. By all accounts, 
the crowds comprised a cross section of the working- class population of the 
community in which the strike occurred. The press did not generally comment on the 
ethnicity of participants except  in the Port Arthur and Fort William strike,  where  it  
emphasized  the  role  of  Finnish and Hungarian immigrants (Morning Herald (Fort 
William) 1913b),33 who, according to a government observer, were "inflamed by 
socialist agitation" (Public Archives of Canada). In that strike's aftermath, the Ottawa 
Journal (1913) commented that the "'bad actors'  in the industrial world in America 
almost invariably are foreigners, men who do not seem to understand to the full what 
law means in this country." Women and girls were also present, as were some 
members of the more respectable classes. This led Hamilton Police Chief Smith to 
express his disappoinment "that so many respectable citizens and their wives were seen 
on the streets" during the 1906 violence ( Hamilton Spectator 1906a).34 However, it 
was young men who took the lead in the more aggressive crowd actions, which  is  
consistent  with  the  observation that young, single men figure disproportionately in 
collective violence (Courtwright   1996). 
Yet a narrow focus on the role of young men fails to explain why street railway 
strikes were the occasion for collective violence so much more often than other types 
of strikes. Certainly one factor was that in street railway strikes there was a much 
greater opportunity for strike sympathizers to directly confront the employer than in 
most other contexts, simply because so much of the work was performed on public 
streets rather than on private property from which the public could be readily 
excluded. Gatherings of excited crowds, often on a Friday night or Saturday 
afternoon, provided a more permissive environment for displays of youthful 
rebelliousness and bravado. The Toronto Globe picked up this psychological and 
behavioralist theme in an editorial published after the sentencing of some of those 
arrested for their involvement in the Hamilton confrontations. "The conscious 
personality of the individual was absorbed and lost in the unconscious personality 
of the crowd" (Toronto Globe 1906). A narrow focus on crowd psychology, however, is 
not enough. It needs to be supplemented by an examination of the under- lying 
reasons for the hostility toward the street railway, without which the likelihood of 
communal violence would have been quite low, despite the opportunities that were 
available. 
One factor noted in many studies about the street railway companies' unpopularity 
was that, with few exceptions, they were private businesses providing a public service 
pursuant to a monopoly franchise  obtained  from the   city.   The   franchise   contained   
provisions   regarding   service,   road maintenance, and fares, all issues that 
regularly became contentious. As Babcock ( 1982) noted, "The location of lines, the 
efficiency of service, and the fares charged were a constant concern of the 
citizenry" (6), and street railway companies' owners were commonly portrayed in 
the press as rich monopolists exploiting the public (Armstrong and Nelles 1986, 38-
55; Kostal 1999, 289; Heron forthcoming). 
This characterization of the street railway fed into a populist worldview that allied 
the beleaguered community with street railway workers who also were easily seen to 
be the monopolist's victims and who were well known to the passengers who rode the 
lines regularly ( Molloy 1996, 35-38). There was, as well, widespread working-class 
community support for many of union's basic demands: a right to collective 
representation, a grievance procedure, a living wage, reasonable hours of work, and 
basic amenities.35 The fact that the union was prepared to put its demands before 
impartial arbitrators strength- ened the public's view of their reasonableness. And 
finally, the street railway companies' choice of tactics, particularly the use of scab 
labor and the hiring of professional strikebreakers, violated the "moral economy" of 
the crowd (referred to as "a false moral code" in the M ontreal Gazette (1903e) ). All 
of this hostility was like kindling, awaiting a spark or two to set it off; and when it did, 
a significant number of people were prepared to draw on older tradi- tions of rough 
justice that justified violations of the current legal norms governing streetplace 
behavior (Thompson 1971; Palmer 1992, 66-69; see 1997). Phillips Thompson, a 
lawyer turned labor journalist (writing under the pseudonym of Enjolras), captured 
this sentiment in a comment on the dis- turbances surrounding the 1886 Toronto 
street railway strike: 
 
Whenever there is long continued and deep-seated injustice-wherever human rights 
are defied and trampled upon, there will be aroused a spirit of  resistance  which  
sometimes  may  overpass  its  legitimate  bounds. 
. . . But we do say that however misled or inconsiderate or even criminal some 
actions done in the heat of the conflict between Labor and capital- ism may be, the 
responsibility for those actions rests on the individuals, and the system which 
provoked them. (Enjolras [Thompson] 1886) 
Most public commentators, however, did not empathize with the moral economy of 
the working-class crowd and were highly critical of the violence. For example, the 
Halifax Herald , which only recently had portrayed the street railway owners as 
corrupt monopolists, splashed a headline across its front page the morning after the 
violent confrontations, freely mixing news with editorial comment: "Rioters For Time 
In Partial Control At Halifax But Law And Order Must Be Maintained" ( Halifax 
Herald 1913). Union officials understood that there was very limited public tolerance 
for violence in their communities and were quick to condemn it. Speaking to the press 
after collective violence during the 1906 Winnipeg street railway strike, Fred Fay, an 
AASRE representative, promised that "everything possible will be done to prevent the 
destruction of property and the injury of the cars" (Winnipeg Free Press 1906a). In 
short, there was no organized group seeking to expand the violence or exacerbate 
further divisions  between  street  railway  companies and their employees or the 
communities they served, and this undoubtedly helped  to prevent  the collective 
violence  from escalating. 
However, even without further escalations, once the violence intensified beyond 
sporadic individual actions, local officials were pressed to regain control of the streets. 
In Montreal, for example, after collective violence significantly reduced the ability of 
the company to provide service, the board of trade called an emergency meeting at 
which it passed a resolution calling the mayor's attention to the fact that the law was 
being "systematically and openly violated" and demanding that the police be instructed 
to vigorously enforce it ( M ontreal Gazette 1903c). In the same paper, an editorial ( M 
ontreal Gazette 1903b) decried the laxity that some police officers had shown. Simi- 
larly, the Toronto Globe, which earlier had expressed some sympathy with the union's 
position, strongly denounced the violence on Toronto streets in its editorial titled "The 
Strike and Public Order": "In British communities we do not plead for the preservation 
of the peace and the recognition of the law. We compel respect for the law and due 
submission to public authority" ( Toronto Globe 1902b).36 Respect for the official rule 
of law was presented as a para- mount value for "British" society.37 Indeed, one legal 
commentator, reflecting on recent street railway strikes, reified the law to make his 
point: "The law is bound to protect itself. It cannot be violated on any pretext without 
injury to society at large, and to the weakening of its legitimate and necessary author- 
ity" (O'Brien  1905, 732). 
Yet it was public authorities who had to determine when and where to draw the 
line and how to enforce it, and on these questions there was often considerable 
disagreement. On the one hand, the street railway was often unpopular, and local 
officials were sometimes wary of being seen to be taking their side. On the other hand, 
civic order was clearly being disturbed, and the rights of the streetcar owners were 
being violated. Typically, as the level ofdisorder escalated so did the enforcement 
effort; the imperative of maintain- ing civic order increasingly trumped other 
considerations. Still, the question of how far to go remained. 
Often the first response was to make better use of local police by deploy- ing more 
officers or instructing them to enforce the law more strictly. Inten- sification of the 
enforcement effort at this stage, however, usually did not involve greater use  of force; 
guns were rarely drawn, the exception being when crowds attacked police officers in an 
effort to free a demonstrator who was being arrested or detained. The bloodiest 
confrontation took place during the 1913 street railway strike in Port Arthur and Fort 
William, when a crowd estimated at some two thousand attempted to storm a local 
police station where a rock-throwing demonstrator was being held. Warning shots failed 
to stop the attack, and police fired into the crowd, killing one man and wound- ing 
another ( M orning Herald 1913a; Morrison 1974, 241-43).38 This was the only fatality 
out of all Canadian street railway strikes. The local press blamed the "foreigners" and 
"agitators" for the violence, and local labor leaders did not protest the police reaction; 
but Cotton' s Weekly, the official organ of the Socialist Party of Canada, asked, "How 
long will this beastly law stand which allowed a uniformed savage to haul out guns and 
blaze away into a crowd of toilers?" ( Cotton' s Weekly 1913). 
Even the most committed police force lacked the resources  to  keep unruly crowds 
from disrupting streetcar operations. On some occasions, municipalities temporarily  
increased  the  size  of  their  forces  by  swearing in special constables.39 This became 
quite contentious during the 1906 Winnipeg strike when a provincial magistrate, 
Alexander McMicken, was alleged to have sworn in one hundred strikebreakers at the 
railway company's request. This action uncomfortably blurred the boundary between 
public and private spheres of power, and the provincial attorney general suspended 
McMicken a few days later pending an investigation (Winnipeg Free Press 1906b,  
1906d). 
As noted earlier, street railway companies often hired professional strike- breakers and 
private security forces to protect their  property  and continue their operations. The 
precise limits on the power of private security forces were not clearly defined, but, as a 
general matter, they would have been permitted to use reasonable force to protect 
private property. But how much force was reasonable? Private detectives were on 
occasion charged with assault, but they typically left town before they could be tried 
(Winnipeg Free Press 1906c). Fortunately, their power to use  lethal force to protect 
private property  never had to be legally determined. 
The two strongest measures that municipal officials could take were to read the 
Riot Act, which required all those present to disperse and authorized the use of force 
if they did not, and to call up the militia in aid of the civil power (Morton 1970). 
There was no legal test that determined when the Riot Act could be read, but rather it 
depended on a judgment by municipal officials about the need for such action. 
Generally, they were reluctant to take this step, in part because they did not want 
to incur the financial cost of the militia, but more importantly because mayors 
generally did not wish to be seen as taking the side of the street railways against 
their employees. The tipping point was usually reached when collective violence 
became more widespread. 4° For example, the militia was first called out several weeks 
into the 1899 strike in London, Ontario, after escalating sabotage turned into 
collective violence on a Saturday afternoon. Arrests by local police and pleas from the 
mayor convinced many of the estimated twenty-five hundred people present to 
disperse, but when a large crowd reassembled that evening and attacked more 
streetcars, the mayor gave in to pressure from the company and read the Riot Act. 
Police were still unable to disperse the crowd, and so the militia was called out. A 
small squad of thirty-two soldiers arrived early Sunday morning and dispersed the last 
of the crowd. Soldiers remained on duty for twelve days before returning to their 
barracks. Even under these circum- stances, the actions of local officials were sharply 
criticized. London, Ontario, workers staged a procession mocking the company's lawyer 
and a local director for their role in having the militia called out, while the 
AASRE journal proclaimed, "If President Everett thought that by getting the militia 
out he could scare Johnny Canuck into submission, he was very badly mistaken" ( 
M otorman and Conductor 1899). Some local newspapers also criticized the decision 
to call in the troops, both because of the expense and because the action tarnished 
the reputation of the city (Industrial Banner 1899; Palmer 1976, 120-22; Kostal 1999, 
302-03). The decisions to use troops in Winnipeg (1906), Hamilton (1906), and Saint 
John ( 1914) were not as controversial, but this may be because officials waited longer 
before acting. 
The response to the presence of the militia very much depended on the role 
they were called upon to play. In Toronto, "the moral effect" of the troops' presence, 
as Toronto's Chief Constable H. ]. Grasett put it, was sufficient to put an end to the 
disturbances, and so there was nothing in their conduct to criticize (Toronto City 
Council M inutes 1903, 51). Similarly, the troops called up in Winnipeg largely 
remained in the background. Where troops played a more active role, they were more 
likely to meet resistance or to be criticized for their conduct. In Saint John, for 
example, eight members of the Royal Canadian Dragoons who charged through the 
crowd were met by a barrage of stones and other missiles and forced to withdraw and 
await reinforcements ( Saint John Globe 1914). In Hamilton, the sheriff read the Riot Act 
and police, backed by the troops, stormed into the crowd, the police swinging their 
batons while the mounted soldiers used the flat sides of their swords to move anyone 
who resisted. Afterwards, Colonel Septimus Denison, the commander of the troops, 
expressed surprise at the antagonism they encountered from "seemingly good citizens" ( 
Hamilton Spectator 1906b; Morton  1970, 424-25). Those citizens, including several 
aldermen, were just as quick to condemn the actions of the police, accusing them of 
being overly zealous in their use of force. In contrast, the troops did not attract much 
criticism, although some merchants refused to sell them provisions or found their 
teamsters unwilling to deliver to them ( Hamilton Spectator 1906c; Weaver  1990, 115; 
Heron  forthcoming).41 
Courts also became involved in maintaining civic order, largely through their 
treatment of those charged with crimes arising out of the demonstra- tions. Police 
magistrates heard the bulk of the cases, but county court judges also became involved 
when the charges were more serious or if the accused elected to be tried by judge and 
jury. However, no cases went to higher courts, and thus there are no reported  
judgments arising out of these prosecutions. The severity of the sentences imposed upon 
convicted participants in the collective violence varied considerably, depending on the 
predilections of the individual judge as well as the judge's assessment of the 
seriousness of the individual act, the level of disorder, and the need to send a clear 
message that unlawful behavior was unacceptable. For example, Magistrate Denison 
dealt quite harshly with those that were brought before him for their actions in the 1886 
Toronto street railway strike (Tucker 1994, 298-301), while Magistrate Daly in 
Winnipeg was far more lenient with those charged with strike-related offenses in 1906 
and 1910 (Winnipeg Free Press 1906e, 1910a). Accused strikebreakers usually slipped 
out of town before their cases came to trial. 
In sum, streetplace or civic order during street railway strikes was imper- fectly 
maintained. Large crowds sympathetic to the aims of strikers repeatedly violated the 
law, and, for periods of time, local officials and police lacked both the commitment and 
the resources to fully protect the property and contract rights of street railway 
companies to operate with scab labor on public streets. Yet there was a breaking point, 
however imperfectly defined, which if crossed triggered the use of coercive force to 
suppress collective violence and restore streetplace order, the effect of which was also 
to help sustain workplace and marketplace orders within a range that kept the 
liberal order of Canadian capitalism "on track."42 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As this case study of collective action by Canadian streetcar workers 
demonstrates, the project of constructing and maintaining a liberal capitalist order 
took place at a number of sites, each of which was, at different times and places and to 
different degrees, contested by workers and working-class com- munities acting 
collectively to achieve their vision of a legitimate workplace, marketplace, and 
streetplace order. Employers and state officials understood that these three dimensions 
ofliberal ordering overlapped and that challenges in one could have spillover effects 
in another. For that reason, for example, employers and officials made efforts to 
prevent collective action that contested the workplace order from harming the 
marketplace economic order, both by compelling conciliation in those sectors of the 
economy where workers' capacity to disrupt was particularly great and by limiting 
broader labor solidar- ity. Similarly, the impact of workplace conflict on the streetplace 
order was also to be contained, whether the source of the disruption was collective 
action by striking workers or, in the case of the street railways, by sympathetic members 
of working-class communities. In tum, limitations on the ability of workers' collective 
action to disrupt the marketplace or streetplace order limited their power to challenge 
and transform the workplace order. 
Yet, while worker collective action clashed with the project of construct- ing the 
order of liberal capitalism, it could not be suppressed entirely; nor could the space 
for workers' collective action in the workplace, marketplace, and streetplace order 
simply be confined by fixing legal limits on what was acceptable according to the 
ideal of liberal ordering. Rather, actual orders were created through processes of 
conflict and accommodation that reflected shifting balances of power and changing 
ideas about the scope of legitimate conduct, which developed within the context of 
the historical legacy of constitutional, political, legal, and institutional arrangements. 
Moreover, as this study of Canadian street railway strikes demonstrates, the actual 
opera- tion of liberal orders at any given time and place was, within a certain range, 
determined by local conditions, individual predilections of legal and political officials, 
and other contingent factors. Although the frequency and severity of the challenge to 
the streetplace order posed by street railway strikes was exceptional compared to 
strikes by most other workers, 43 and the responses were so variable, it is precisely 
these features that make collective action by street railway workers such a rich 
illustration of the complexity surrounding the construction, maintenance, and 
development of liberal orders. 
  
NOTES 
 
1. Following Charles Tilly (2003, 18), I have avoided using the word "riot" to categorize 
collective violence, since it imports a normative judgment made by public authorities about the 
nature of the conduct. 
2. For an insightful discussion of the multiple dimensions of capitalist social ordering, see 
de Sousa Santos (2002, chap. 6). 
3. The Knights of Labor was a nineteenth-century union established in Philadelphia that 
grew rapidly in the 1880s and equally as rapidly declined. It was distinguished by its inclusive- 
ness, in contrast to more traditional craft unions. On the Knights of Labor in Ontario, see 
Kealey and Palmer (1982). On the Knights of Labor in the United States, see Fink (1983). 
4.  I have intentionally avoided usage of the more common term "public order" because  it 
reinforces a common assumption I wish to challenge, namely, that workplace and marketplace orders 
are private. 
5.  For a brief discussion of this history, see Tilly (2008, 62-87). 
6. I draw on McKay ( 2000), who makes the important analytical distinction "between the 
liberal order as a principle of rule and the often partisan historical forms this principle has taken 
through 150 years of Canadian history" (623). 
7. On the distinction between  the "high law" of the judges and the "low law" of the 
magistrates, see Hay (1992) and Karsten (2002, 1-18). 
8. The Toronto Street Railway was briefly owned and operated by the municipality in 
1891 after one franchise elapsed and before another was granted, while the Calgary and Port 
Arthur and Fort William street railway systems were municipally owned from their inception 
(Sinclair 1891; Armstrong and Nelles 1986, 241-43; High 1997). 
9. For an overview of working conditions, see Lambly (1983, chap. 1). The Toronto 
Railway Company provided motormen and conductors with a detailed rulebook governing their 
conduct (see Toronto Railway Company 1902). 
10. For example, the Toronto Railway Company kept their employees under close sur- 
veillance, and their Records of Suspensions of Motormen 1899-1903 (Toronto Archives) contain 
voluminous reports of employee misconduct ranging from serious matters like "being in liquor" 
or causing a collision to relatively minor ones like gossiping with passengers, missing a fare, or 
running ahead of time. No reports of trade union activity are entered on the records. The 
widespread use of private detective agencies to spy on street railway employees led the Trades 
and Labour Congress to pass a resolution calling for a law to make it a criminal offense to 
discharge an employee based on evidence furnished by a private detective ( Labour Gazette 
1914c). For a study of the practice in the United States, see Jennifer Luff (2008). 
11. Other groups of street railway employees included laborers, shop workers, and office 
workers. Of these, the only ones that are likely to have unionized are craft workers engaged in 
the shops, but they had major conflicts with the street railway companies during this period. 
12. On paternalism and welfarism in Canadian street railway operations, see Roy (1972, 
19-73); Lambly (1983, 39--40); Armstrong and Nelles (1986, 227); Labour Gazette (1903c, 
1903e). For the United States, see Emmons (1911) and Molloy (1996). 
13. The union later changed its name to the Amalgamated Association of Street and 
Electric Railway Employees to reflect the change in technology. 
14. For examples of second strikes after the collapse of a prior agreement, see Table 1 
(Toronto, 1886; London, 1899; and Montreal,  1903). 
15. In 1899 the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) passed a resolution calling for a law 
that would require street railway drivers to serve a thirty-day apprenticeship and pass an 
examination (Trades and Labour Congress of Canada 1899, 27). No legislative action followed. 
For the Ontario hours of work legislation, see An Act to Amend the Ontario Railway and 
Municipal Board Act S. 0. 1912, c. 37. In response to complaints made by street railway 
companies, the original Ontario bill was amended to also specify that "whenever practical and 
reasonable" the ten hours should be performed within twelve consecutive hours (Toronto Globe 
1912). A delegation of the TLC had requested legislation for the protection of workers on street 
railways as early as 1903 (Labour Gazette 1903a). 
16. The Hamilton street railway interpreted the clause as allowing voluntary overtime at a 
rate of pay less than the minimum stipulated, a matter disputed by the men (see Motonnan and 
Conductor 1899, 577-78). For a discussion ofother prolabor measures enacted by Hamilton City 
Council, see Heron (forthcoming). 
17. For the Nova Scotia legislation, see An Act "Of Street Railway Companies" S. N .S. 
1911, c. 11, and An Act to Amend Chapter 11, Acts of 1911, entitled "Of Street Railway 
Companies," amended by S. N.S. 1913, c. 52. Most protections did not come into force until 
deemed necessary or feasible by the Public Utilities Board. An application by the union to have 
these provisions brought into force was rejected by the board in 1914 ( Labour Gazette 1915). 
Later that year, the legislature amended the law to make air brakes and instruction mandatory. 
18. New contracts were successfully negotiated without resort to strikes or lockouts using 
the agreement's conciliation process  in  1904 and  1907 ( Labour  Gazette  1904, 1907b). 
19. The Hamilton case has been studied in more detail by Palmer ( 1979, 209-16), Lambly 
(1983, 59--60), and Heron (forthcoming). The union barely hung on in the aftermath of the 
1906 strike. The president of the union that led the strike was sacked a year later, allegedly for 
union activity, and there were charges of discrimination against union members. A majority of 
an !DIA board dismissed the union's complaint. In subsequent years, street railway management 
signed agreements with the union that included, among other provisions, a recognition clause 
and a grievance procedure. This was an accomplishment in an era when most Hamilton 
employers were becoming even more fiercely antiunion (Heron forthcoming). 
20. The other innovation was increased judicial involvement in limiting the tactics of 
strikers through the use of injunctions. This development will not be addressed here because 
injunctions were rarely sought in street railway strikes. One exception was during the 1910 
strike in Winnipeg, when garment and cap makers were locked out as a result of their refusal to 
make uniforms for the street railway during the strike ( Labour Gazette 191lb, 191lc). 
21. For example, the Winnipeg Free Press ( l 906i) estimated the cost of the three-day 1906 
strike to the company ($40,000), the men ($21,000), and the public ($21,000), but this was 
mostly based on guesswork. 
22. The one exception was a legislative scheme in Nova Scotia that only applied to coal 
mines. Workers and employers faced sanctions for engaging in strikes or lockouts prior to 
making a request for arbitration; either party could apply for arbitration, and the other could be 
compelled to participate; and arbitration awards, which could establish wage rates, were binding 
(McCallum 1990). This law, as well as the others, proved to be ineffective and was rarely 
invoked. 
23. As noted above, a compulsory arbitration clause was subsequently agreed to and relied 
upon to resolve a number of disputes. See Toronw Globe (1902c; 1902e) for further editorial 
comments on the strike. 
24. For other instances in which IDIA boards upheld  management  discipline  against union 
officials, often over union nominee dissents, see Labour Gazette (1911a) (for Winnipeg) and 
Labour Gazette (1913b) (for Port Arthur). 
25. The quote comes from the board's report on the Saint John dispute arising, in part, 
over the termination of the union president, Fred Ramsey. Ultimately, to resolve the dispute, 
Ramsey was offered and accepted a lifetime position with the city's public works department ( 
Labour Gazette 1914a; Babcock 1994, 24). 
26. In another dispute an !DIA board also called for recognition of the AASRE union in 
Saint John, but  the employer refused. A violent strike followed that ended without union 
recognition being gained (Lambly 1983, 75-77). 
27. I treat this topic at greater length in Tucker (2009). 
28. These criteria, "level of coordination" and "salience of violence," are used by Tiily 
(2003) to construct a very helpful typology of collective violence. Collective violence in street 
railway strikes tended to range between Tiily's categories of "scattered attacks" and "brawls," 
both of which are characterized by low levels of coordination but that differ in regard to the 
salience of violence. 
29. The broad similarities over time and place in the distinctive practices of street railway 
unions, crowds of sympathizers, street railway owners, and state officials fit nicely into Tiily's ( 
1993) concept of repertoires of contention as "learned cultural creations" that "emerge from 
struggle" (264) and shape the behavior of all those involved in the conflict. Tiily  (2008) 
subsequently elaborated on these ideas. 
30. For background and discussion of this act, see Atherton (1972, chap. 9) and Riddell 
(1921). 
31. On the question of the legality of boycotts at the time, see Tucker (1994, 308--29) and 
Tucker and Fudge (1996, 107-10). No legal actions were brought against street railway unions 
for organizing boycotts despite expressions of concern, such as the following that appeared in 
the M onetary Times (1899, 171): "The boycott is being used as an instrument of tyranny, 
affecting people absolutely innocent of any connection with the strikers or the company. That 
it is possible to so expand the limits of a dispute is evidence of the power which labor now 
exercises in its contest with capital." 
32. On history of the Riot Act, see Gilmour  (1993,  135-36). 
33. On the hostility of local elites in the Port Arthur and Fort William to foreigners, see 
Morrison (1974, 242-50; 1976). 
34. The chief's reflexive use of the phrase "citizens and their wives" captures the dominant 
understanding that women, who were still denied the vote, were not themselves full citizens 
(Strong-Boag 2002). More generally, his disappointment was rooted in the expectation that the 
respectable classes, above all others, would comport themselves along bourgeois norms of 
legitimate behavior on public streets. For other sources identifying the presence of women in the 
crowd, see Palmer (1976, 121) and Babcock (1982, 18). 
35. The linkage between the working class and wider community support originated with 
Gutman (1976), who is cited by many of the scholars writing about street railway strikes. For 
example, see Palmer (1979, 216), Henry (1991, 352), Babcock (1994, 372), and Ziegler (1977, 
71). 
36. The M onetary Times (1886a) expressed a similar concern about the police depart- ment's 
failure to control mob violence during the March 1886 strike, but it complimented the police 
commissioner's more forceful response to the May 1886 strike-related violence ( M onetary Times 
1886b). 
37. In the context of Toronro at the tum of the twentieth century, the identification of the 
community as British would not have been viewed as particularly controversial, although the 
meaning of being "British" was contested by workers who sometimes invoked the historic rights 
of freeborn British subjects to support their workplace demands (Reimer 1993; Komeski 2007). 
38. There were two other reports of police discharging firearms. During the 1913 Saint John 
strike, a police officer fired his gun and wounded a demonstrator (Babcock 1982, 18), and during 
the 1910 Winnipeg strike, a police officer fired a gun at a window breaker (Winnipeg Free Press  
1910b). During the 1906 Hamilton strike, a police officer drew his gun but did not fire it ( 
Hamilton Spectator 1906a). 
39. For example, during the May 1903 street railway strike in Montreal, firemen  were sworn 
in as special police ( M ontreal Gazette 1903d). 
40. The exception was during the 1902 Toronto street railway strike when local officials 
hastily called in the militia at the first sign of disorder, an action for which they were widely 
criticized both by the labor movement and the local press (Toronto Globe 1902d, 1902e). 
41. There is some suggestion in the newspaper accounts that the troops were reluctant to 
use force and that the ground troops refused to make a bayonet charge after being ordered to do 
so by Colonel Denison ( Hamilton Spectator 1906b). 
42. Kostal (1999, 310) makes a similar point. 
43. The closest comparison is mining strikes, which often involved  the entire mining 
community and tended to occur in isolated towns populated largely by miners and their families. 
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